noted that: 'In the case of the soke of pleas, some of these profits belong peculiarly and exclusively to the royal treasury, some are shared by it with others, some belong to the sheriffs and royal officials in their farm, and some belong to the lords who have soke and sake.'; 51  Tax Collectors -Sheriffs & Bailiffs. In the time of Henry I, tax collection was effected by sheriffs and their bailiffs. The former often paid a 'farm' (ferm) 52 to the sovereign, giving them a right to collect taxes (or other duties and rents) owed to the sovereign. Sometimes, whole shires were farmed. While this was very useful to the Exchequer -since they only had to deal with one person -it was an open invitation to sheriffs (and their bailiffs) to practice extortion and other forms of fraud, extracting as much as they could from the payees, to enable the sheriffs to pay their farm as well as to make a hefty profit. It was, likely for this reason, the citizens of London acquired from Henry I by a charter c. 1131/2, the right to pay the farm for the City of London and Middlesex, as well as to appoint their own sheriff. 53 It is also likely that 'tax farming' derived from Roman law. Then, farmers were called 'publicans' and they were, similarly, rapacious; 54  Theft. Jurisdictional rights were reserved to the Crown in respect of the unlawful appropriation of the king's land or money (presumptio terre vel peccunie regis). 55 This is not unexpected. it is not something a sovereign would generally want to franchise. Further, under the Laws of Henry I, concealment of the king's own chattels was equivalent to theft.
(b) Punishments
As to punishments for appropriating (that is, stealing or failing to pay) the sovereign's revenue, the following may be noted:
 Appropriating Sovereign's Revenue. The Laws of Henry I do not make crystal clear what was the punishment when a person (especially the sheriff who was primarily liable for tax collection) cheated the Exchequer. For example, appropriating sums due to the sovereign. However, since 'unlawful appropriation' of the king's money was a matter for the jurisdiction of the Crown and -since 'concealment of the king's own chattels' was treated as theft -any dishonest appropriation of the sovereign's money would almost certainly have been held to be theft. 57 It is also clear -from the Laws of Henry I -that theft was a generic crime of wide scope; 58 51 Ibid. 'Sake and soke' (there are a number of variant spellings) probably comprised a Crown grant of judicial jurisdiction, including the right to hold a court and the profits arising therefrom (ie. the collection of fines and amercements for various criminal offences). See Fleta, n 7, vol 72, p 101. See generally, McBain, n 39, pp 106-7. See 
also R v The Dean and Chapter of St Martin-Le-Grand in the Year Books of Edward II, The
Eyre of London 14 Edward II, AD 1321, SS, vol 86, p 296 per Stanton J 'Soke means (the right) to hold a court for their tenants; sake means the right to have in that court the amends of trespasses.' 52 A rent collector or farmer (firmarius or fermor) bought the right to collect rents and/or taxes on behalf of the sovereign. This, in return for a fixed rent or farm (firma comitatus), which was usually annual, which he paid to the Exchequer, for the sovereign. The word derived from the Anglo-Saxon 'foerme' (farm). See The sheriffs were the chief agents for bringing in the Revenue and a great part of the land revenue went through their hands: they were the king's bailiffs of their respective counties. The other accountants were the escheators, foresters, the farmers or custodes of such towns and burghs as were not part of the corpus comitatus, nor within the sheriff's receipt, the custodes cambia, the customers, the keepers of the wardrobe and others. And in succeeding times, the collectors of tallages, dismes, aids, etc…All accountants rendered their accounts at the Exchequer in a somewhat similar manner to the sheriffs…' 53 The charter (the original was in latin) provided that: 'I have granted to my citizens of London, to hold Middlesex to farm for [£300], upon accompt to them and their heirs; so that the said citizens shall place a sheriff [vicecomitem] whom they will of themselves'. In fact, two sheriffs were appointed (for the City and Middlesex), although they were treated as one.' See McBain, n 52, p 6. 54 A particular praetorian Edict governed farmers collecting tax (tribute) by force, see A Watson, The Digest of Justinian (Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1985) , vol 3, p 403 (D.39.4). If the farmer took anything by force in the name of the public revenue (or they took wrongfully or by theft) the fine was double the sum involved. The jurist Ulpian noted that 'Tax farmers are those who enjoy the use of public money (whence the name publicani), whether they pay vectigal [tax] to the treasury or collect tribute.' Ibid. D 39.4.1. 55 Downer, n 43, p 109 'These are the jurisdictional rights which the king of England has in his land solely and over all men, reserved through a proper ordering of peace and security…unlawful appropriation of the king's land or money.' 56 Ibid, p 117, 'Concealment of the king's own chattels is equivalent to theft' (dominica capitalia regis celata pro furto habeantur). See also P & M, n 40, vol 2, p 499. 57 Up to the time of Henry I (1100-35), payments to the Crown were not usually in money but in specie (such as food, drink, animals etc). If any of these allocated to the Crown were mis-appropriated, this would be theft. Thus, there is no reason to believe that money payments to the Crown (often, such payments comprised objects of gold and silver until coinage became more common in the reign of Henry I) would have been treated differently. See T Madox, The History and Antiquities of Exchequer of the Kings of England (2 nd ed, 1769) republished by  Punishment -Theft. As to the punishment for theft, the Laws provided that a person who committed theft forfeited his land. 59 Further, some forms of theft could be compensated, others could not. 60 Thus, manifest theft (also called, 'open theft' or 'hand having theft ') 61 could not be compensated and, indeed, summary punishment was often administered in respect of it. 62 More particularly, theft punishable with death was a matter for the royal courts. 63 In the case of appropriating the sovereign's revenue (such as underpaying, or stealing, taxes or court fees), this was not manifest theft. Therefore, payment of a wite (fine) would apply;  Likelihood of Appropriating Sovereign's Revenue. In the case of sheriffs (and their assistants), one would suspect that they did not seek to appropriate the sovereign's revenues often, since there were easier ways for a sheriff to make money. If a sheriff appropriated such money, he would incur (at least) a heavy fine, forfeiture of land and (probably) loss of a lucrative office. 64 Thus, common sense suggests that a sheriff 'on the make' was more likely to pay the Exchequer the sums they calculated he owed, and then practice extortion using the power of his office. This helps explain why sheriffs achieved a level of infamy -resulting in a progressive diminution of their tax gathering and judicial powers after Magna Carta 1215. 65 As for the payment of tax, a failure to pay Danegeld resulted in payment of a wite (fine)(see above). Since Danegeld was an oppressive tax in any case, payment of an additional fine would be even more.
In conclusion, it is asserted that a person appropriating the sovereign's revenue in the time of Henry I (1100-35) would be punished for theft -the same as if that person had stolen the sovereign's chattels. 'Appropriating' would mean any dishonest failure to pay Danegeld or other monies owed to the Crown.

Early History-From Henry I -Edward I (1272-1307)
The first legal text, Glanvill's Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm (c. 1189) 66 did not deal with crimes relating to the revenue.
(a) Exchequer 67
The text -Dialogue concerning the Exchequer (Dialogus de Scaccario) 68 -which is thought to have been written c. 1189 by (possibly) Richard Fitznigel (also called Richard Fitzneal, c. 1130-98) is useful since he was the Greenwood Press, NY 1969, ch 9 (of the species wherein the ancient Crown revenue was usually paid). See also Fitzneale, n 48, p 20 and Thomas, n 52, p 25. 58 Basically, there was theft and robbery (ie. theft with force), the law on theft not having yet separated into a large number of common law (and, later, statutory) sub-divisions. The position under early Roman law was the same. 59 Downer, n 43, p 153 'Anyone who commits a theft…shall forfeit his land.' 60 Ibid, p 189 'Every theft, whether of livestock or other chattels, whether of one thing or of several, may be amended by making compensation or may not; of the ones which may be compensated for, some are satisfied by the loss of a limb, others by the payment of money.' 61 For a description of manifest theft, see Bracton, n 5, vol 2, p 425. 62 Thus, persons caught by hue and cry with stolen property on them, were usually executed on the spot. Ibid, p 115 'Some pleas cannot be compensated for with money…manifest theft.' By 1290, the dividing line for theft punishable with death or not was if the sum exceeded 12d (about 8 days wages for a labourer at the time), see Britton, n 6, p 47. Manifest theft was still capital in the 13 th century. P & M, n 40, vol 2, p 496 'In the thirteenth century manifest grand larceny was a capital crime…'. 63 Downer, n 43, p 109 'Jurisdictional rights which the king of England had in his own land solely and over all men' included 'theft punishable by death'. Also, p 117 'Pleas which place a man in the king's mercy…manifest theft punishable by death (furtum probatum et morte dignum). 64 Misconduct by a public official was also a very old offence at common law, see n 1. 65 See generally, GSMcBain, Abolishing Obsolete Offices (2012) Coventry LJ, vol 17, pp 31-60. Magna Carta (1215) began the process of reducing the sheriff's powers generally. Chapter 24 provided that: 'no sheriff, constable, coroners, or others of our bailiffs, shall hold pleas of our Crown.' and chapter 42 (1297 version) provided that no sheriff or bailiff was to make his tourn more often that twice a year. WS McKechnie, Magna Carta (Glasgow, John Maclehose & Sons, 1914), p 305 'The sheriffs and castellans deserved their bad repute: the records of the age overflow with tales of their cruelties and oppressions.' At p 311 'No royal officer was more justly hated than the sheriff.' 42 Edw III (1368), s 9 provided that no sheriff or under sheriff or sheriff's clerk could hold office for more than a year. See also J Reeves, History of the English Law (Dublin, 2 nd ed, 1787), vol 3, p 281. 66 R Glanvill (trans G Hall), Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm (Nelson, 1965) . Glanvill made it clear that he was only dealing with the king's court and not the sheriff's court etc. Ibid, p 177. And, in Glanvill's time, theft did not belong to the Crown pleas but to the sheriff. Ibid, pp 3-4, 'Pleas are either criminal or civil. Some criminal pleas belong to the crown of the lord king, and some to the sheriffs of counties…The crime of theft…belongs to the sheriffs, and is pleaded and determined in the counties.' 67 See Madox, n 57. See also Thomas, n 52. For some remarks on the Exchequer in the 16 th century, T Smith, De Republica Anglorum (1562-3)(ed M Dewar, Cambridge UP, 1982), pp 96-9. 68 See n 48.
king's treasurer for some forty years. 69 Further, Fitznigel was the nephew of Roger, Bishop of Salisbury who organised the Exchequer under Henry I when it was separated from the chamberlain's office in the king's household. Therefore, the description of the Exchequer in this work likely reflects the Exchequer in the time of Henry I (1100-35) 70 as further altered under Henry II (1154-89).
 Exchequer. What seems clear both from this work -and that of Madox 71 -is that the Exchequer (which kept the Crown's accounts) was well organised in both the reigns of Henry I and II. And, that sums owed to the Crown were rigorously enforced. Indeed, the system was carefully designed to prevent any form of tax or revenue evasion;  Appearance in Person. Thus, the Dialogue noted that any debtor -or a sheriff to whom debts were farmed -had to appear in person at the Exchequer twice a year (usually at Easter and Michaelmas), after being summoned. 72 The summons itemized what they owed (their 'account' or accompte); estates and goods could be distrained to meet the debt (levy being made by the sheriff). 79 Also, he could be apprehended and delivered to the king's marshall who could send him (if the marshall thought proper) to a public prison. 80 Finally, a debtor could only be discharged of sums owed when he was discharged by the Exchequer.
The basic premise in these times -and thereafter -was stated by Madox:
If an accountant did not come to render his account, or did not pursue the same in due manner, he was punished several ways: namely, by distress and seizure of his lands, and by amercement. If he did not answer to the Crown the debts or sums wherewith he was charged, he was committed either to the Marshall, or to the Fleet Prison, or to the Tower of London…If debtors did not keep their terms or days of attermination, 81 they were amerced; and sometimes by neglecting to make a second or third payment, forfeited or lost the sum which they had actually paid in for their first payment. 82 Finally, sums owed to the Exchequer (the king's debt) was always to be paid first. 83 As to the basis on which the Exchequer operated:
 Structure of the Exchequer. 91 Casual revenue mainly comprised: treasure trove, fines, forfeited recognizances, waif, wreck, chattels of felons and fugitives, chattels of outlaws, usurers, recreants, persons executed etc.
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As to defrauding the Exchequer, this was considered Bracton. 80 Ibid. 81 Madox, n 57,vol 2, p 208 'By attermination is meant, granting men several terms or days for payment of their debt, where they were not able, or could not conveniently pay it at one entire payment.' 82 Ibid, pp 234-5. Of the office of Marshall of the Exchequer, see p 284. See also 13 Edw 1 (1285), s 11 (indebted accountants might be put in prison). 83 Ibid, pp 176-89 (the king could also betake himself for payment to one indebted to his debtor). Further, the king's debtors were to find sureties for payment, if required. Ibid, p 197. 84 Madox, n 57, vol 1, p 262 'Exchequer, was at first a general name, signifying as well the place where the king's revenue was supervised and managed as that where it was wont to be paid in. In the early times, that part of the Exchequer, where the king's treasure was told, reposited, or issued, was usually called the thesaurus. ' See also Coke, n 9, vol 4, pp 131-2 and Thomas, n 52, pp 1, 23-4. 85 89 Reliefs were an incident of tenure. They comprised, in feudal law, the sum a tenant's heir had to pay in order to succeed to his ancestor's property. The payment (which became fixed at one year's additional rent) was made in recognition of the lord's seignory. See DM Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford, 1980) , (definition of reliefs). For reliefs in the time of Henry I (1100-35), see Downer, n 43, p 119. 90 Madox, n 57, vol 1, ch 18 (Madox noted prisage on wine (also called prisa and recta prisa), duties on merchandise (often, the duty was a tenth (disme) or fifteenth (quinzime) of their value) and tronage (weighing of goods etc, see ns 176-7). 91 Escheat comprised land which reverted to the lord if: (a) a tenant died without heirs (escheat propter defectum sanguinis); or (b) if a tenant committed a gross breach of the feudal bond, such as to the Crown in the case of high treason (escheat propter delictum tenentis). Both forms of escheat have been abolished with (a) Theft, according to the laws, is the fraudulent [fraudulenta] mishandling of another's property without the owner's consent, with the intention of stealing, for without the animus furandi it is not committed.
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As Maitland and Pollock noted, essential to this offence was 'taking and carrying away'. 95 Thus, theft readily covered the stealing of chattels such as beasts and goods etc.
 However, theft did not as easily cover the case of one person defrauding another, where the latter willingly handed over their money or possessions, but as a result of a trick. Nor, in the case of the revenue, where (for example) a sheriff dishonestly failed to pay over tax or other sums he had collected;  As a result, it is unsurprising that there developed over the course of time -as also happened with Roman law 96 -specific offences covering fraud, bribery, extortion, exaction and other deceits. However, this was at a later date. 97 In 1240, it seems clear that justices in eyre were still employing the generic offence of theft to cover these offences.
When Bracton considered the matters which justices of eyre were required to inquire into, sheriffs and their bailiffs featured high on the list as malefactors. 98 Thus, Bracton referred to:
 Courts -sheriffs (and bailiffs) who summoned people to courts they convened and who then took amercements for not answering the summons or for not raising the hue and cry or not pursuing it. ed, 1990 ), p 12 'Historically, larceny was an offence against another's possession of goods; and it involved a violation of that possession by 'taking and carrying away' his goods without his consent, with the intention of permanently depriving him of them. Such a 'taking' could not occur where there was a consensual delivery; nor could it occur where the offender was himself already in possession, for instance as a bailee. But one who induced a delivery by fraud was regarded as 'taking' without consent because the fraud was treated as negativing the victim's apparent consent; and a bailee became capable of larceny (by conversion of the goods bailed) by a statutory extension of the offence. The element of 'carrying away' (or 'asportation') required some physical removal of the goods, however slight.' 96 AM Prichard, Leage's Roman Private Law (3 rd ed, 1961), p 400 'it seems that there was much controversy throughout Republican and classical jurisprudence as to what constituted theft…A cause of the confusion was the comparatively late development of the praetorian edict of dolus, late enough to have tempted the early jurists to incorporate in theft cases more of fraud and false pretences -eg. employing false weights to cheat a vendor.' 97 Cf. JC Smith, The Law of Theft (6 th ed, 1989), Preface, 'Theft has come a long way since the law of larceny required 'asportation', a physical taking of property out of the possession of the owner and a carrying away.' 98 Introduction to the Curia Regis Rolls, SS, vol 62, p 419 'Few offices were more desired in the middle ages than the shrievalty, and no official was more frequently called to book for his misdeeds in the records of the period, sometimes in very round terms, than the sheriff.' 99 Bracton, n 5, vol 2, p 330-1. (a) 'sheriffs and other bailiffs of the lord king who held pleas of the Crown…and [of those] who convene the hundred or wapentake courts in order to inquire as to homicide or other pleas of the Crown, [and then] take amercements for not answering the summons or for not raising the hue or for not pursuing it.' (b) 'sheriffs and other bailiffs who hold and determine pleas of the Crown and of replevin…in county or hundred courts, though they have no jurisdiction therein without the special mandate of the lord king and by his writ.' 100 Ibid. (a) 'of the excesses of sheriffs and other bailiffs, whether they have fromented litigation for the purpose of acquiring lands or wardships or of obtaining money or other profits by which justice and truth are stifled or suffer delay.' 101 Ibid, (a) 'of bribes taken for ensuring that corn and other goods shall not be seized for munitioning castles.' (b) 'of bailiffs who have taken gifts or bribes from removing recognitors from juries and assizes; also of sheriffs and bailiffs who have taken ransoms from squires holding a whole knight's fee or having twenty pounds worth of land, that they not be made knights at the king's command, though the sheriffs and other bailiffs have not had special instructions thereon from the king about making such as are of full age knights.' (c) 'of sheriffs and other ambidextrous bailiffs who take bribes from both sides.' (d) 'of sheriffs and other bailiffs who have taken bribes from those accused of homicide for releasing them on bail though they should not be replevied without the special order of the lord king.' 102 Ibid. (a) 'of sheriffs and other bailiffs who have imprisoned those accused of theft by indictments or an approver's appeal and have kept them in prison until they could obtain ransom from them, though they may and ought to be allowed bail by the law of the land without any ransom, or if they took ransom from such men that they not be imprisoned.'  Prises -prises (ie. customs' duties) taken by the sheriffs (as well as constables and other bailiffs) without the consent of those who owned the chattels;
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 Amercements -sheriffs and bailiffs who levied amercements twice over.
104
Bracton also specifically referred to revenue matters which affected the Exchequer:  Distraint 'Of sheriffs and other bailiffs who have distrained anyone to pay more than the sum at which he was amerced by summons of the exchequer;'
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 Prises. 'Of the king's prises… and how much they are worth a year, and who has taken them or concealed them or withheld them.'
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'Prises' referred to goods which were dutiable, such as the prisage of wine (recta prisa) which was a customary charge on imported wine (it was abolished in 1809). 107 There were also other prises imposed in early times on a range of other goods such as: wool, corn, oats, malt, hides, oxen, cattle, salt, meat etc. When Britton (c.1290) came to discuss the frauds of sheriffs and their bailiffs which should be inquired into by justices in eyre, the list was longer than that of Bracton. 109 The deteriorating situation may be explained.
 The reign of Edward I (1272-1307) was characterised by the fact that he was frequently at war -with the Scots and the French. The sovereign was also frequently away from England, providing an opportunity for his officials to become corrupt -something which many of them did.
In his list of things to be inquired of by the justices at eyre, Britton stipulated these included:
our escheators and under escheators…of all their receipts to our use and their own use, how much they have taken for endowing widows, or for suffering them to be endowed, or for permitting heirs being infants to continue with their mothers; and also for making insufficient extents of land, or for certifying our wardships and our marriages to be less than their real value, or for concealing anything which ought to turn to our profit; or for procuring or suffering false inquests to pass upon the ages of our wards, or in any other thing, to our prejudice; and let such presentments as shall be made concerning these officers be enrolled and transmitted to the exchequer, and there determined. We reserve however the judgments upon great 106 Ibid. See also 3 Hen 6 (1425) c 3 (customs officers concealing customs to forfeit treble value The justices were also to enquire into customs and excise matters:
Prisage. 'of wines sold, whereof the tuns did not contain two hundred and forty gallons, and who those are who thus sold them by wholesale; and also of the prisage of wines, how many tuns have been taken to our use since the last eyre, and by whose hands, and whether those wines have been sold to any other than ourselves without our orders; and let this article also be determined at our Exchequer;'
Other Prises. 'all sorts of flesh and fish, and of every kind of spice, wax, silk, canvas, cloth, and avoirdupois, 117 and of all manner of prises, which have been taken to our use since the last eyre, and of the value of each prise. And let inquiry be made concerning our customs of leather and wool, who have collected them, and how many sacks of wool the collectors have permitted to pass without paying custom and how much the yearly value of every kind of custom belonging to us amounts to; and let these articles likewise be determined at our Exchequer, according to the discretion of the treasurer and barons.'
This list of ítems is most useful since it covers -to a greater extent than Bracton did, fifty years earlier -more means by which the Exchequer was being defauded, as well as the punishments.
 In some cases the punishment was by way of fine. In other cases the person would also lose office. And in some cases express reference was made to the Exchequer, leaving it to determine the punishment;
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 Further, it should be noted that matters to be inquired of also covered customs and excise.
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Finally, as can be seen, there was a tendency in Britton to 'lump together' offences such as bribery, embezzlement, theft, fraud etc. This is not suprising since they were treated as different aspects of theftsomething also reflected in a work of the same date to Britton -being the Mirror of Justices.
(b) Mirror of Justices
In the Mirror of Justices (c. 1290), 120 the author noted that:
Larceny is committed sometimes by open thieves, 121 and sometimes by tricksters, as is the case in many kinds of merchandise, and is the case with labourers who steal their labours, and with bailiffs, receivers 117 Britton noted, n 6, p 80 that the word 'avoirdupois' was said to have been applied to all goods sold by weight. See also See also Statutes of the Exchequer, n 109, p 178, art 10 (collectors of customs and wool to make yearly account 'of all parcels received in any of the ports, [or other places of] the realm, so that they shall answer for every ship where it was charged, and how much it carried, [and whose the wools were, and for every other charge] in the ship, whereof custom is due, and for the whole receipt.).' 118 Fleta (c. 1290), n 7, vol 72, p 132 noted that the Exchequer table 'is the place for investigating the fees, rights and franchises belonging to the king. And when there appear in court the sheriffs, escheators, bailiffs and other royal ministers, it is lawful for the barons to hear and determine the plaints of those who are aggrieved either by personal civil wrongs or by false judgements on their part.' 119 As to general taxation, danegeld was supplanted by hydage and carucage. Then, the latter was effectively replaced by tallage (which was supplanted by 1312) and by scutage (which was supplanted by 1315). The main system of taxation then became tenths and fifteenths which were temporary aids levied on personal property. Tenths were said to have been introduced under Henry II (1154-89), the first being the Saladin tithe (tenth) of 1188. The sums for tenths and fifteenth were made certain in 1335 when, by virtue of the king's commission, new taxations were made of every township, borough and city. The system of tenths and fifteenths was replaced by a land tax in 1670. See generally, McBain, n 39, pp 102-3. 120 As to the Exchequer in his time (c. 1290) the author of the Mirror of Justices, p 36, noted 'The Exchequer is a square place which is established solely for the king's profit, where two knights and two clerks, or two literate men, are assigned to hear and determine wrongs done to the king and his crown in respect of his fees and franchises, and also the accounts of his bailiffs and the receivers of the king's revenues and administrators of his goods, under the supervision of a chief who is treasurer of England. The two knights are commonly called barons for the purpose of affeering [ie. assessing] the amerciaments of earls, barons, and of those holding counties and baronies, so that no one may be affeered save by his peers. To this place was assigned a seal and a keeper to make acquittance for every payment to anyone who wished to have it, and to seal writs and the estreats under green wax which issue from this place for the king's profit. ' and administrators of other persons' goods, who steal in rendering account (qi emblent en rendaunt acounte).
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The author further noted that, 'into the sin of larceny', fall, inter alia, those:
 who take wrongful, or outrageous, toll in the market;
 who steal by false measures and weights;
 who amerce any out of their own heads (ie. without legal justification);
 officers of the Exchequer and others who deny receipts under the Exchequer seal to anyone for the amount he has paid, and who more than once require payment of a debt;  sheriffs, bailiffs and other royal officers who unlawfully by extortion take money from the people;
 officers who more than twice a year hold sheriff's courts, or more than once a year hold view of frankpledge in one and the same court, and those who, under unlawful articles, amerce the people. 
(b) Meaning of Words
When reference to the offence of cheating the revenue, the Anglo-Norman word usually employed was 'deceit' or 'deceite' (there are variant spellings). In respect of the word, the following may be noted:  The word 'deceite' in early times was the same as the word for fraud 128 (or a cheat);
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 While the word 'deceite' was similar to a 'pretence' 130 and it often involved deception, it was not synonymous with deception -just as fraud was (and is) not the same as deception. Fraud includes deception -but it is a wider term than deception and it need not involve deception; 131 121 See n 62. Roman law made the same distinction, see Digest, n 54, vol 4, p 251 (D.47.2.2) quoting Gaius, Edict, Bk 13 'Theft is of two kinds: either it is manifest or it is not manifest.' 122 Mirror of Justices, n 8, pp 25-6. 123 Ibid, pp 26-7 (a note states that the articles referred to are the 'capitula' of the view of frankpledge). 124 Tallage was both a specific tax on the Royal demesne and used as a general reference to any tax. See McBain, n 39, p 101. 125 A footnote indicates that the Eyre Roll stated that, when they raised £200 for the king, they collected £300 'from the middling folk' and kept £100 from themselves. 126 and 'deception' imply a positive act of misleading in some sense.
Early History of the Offence -High Crimes
In Bembridge (1783), Mansfield CJ noted that cheating the public revenue could be traced back to, at least, the reign of Edward III (1327-77). Also, that it included omission as well as acts of commission.
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 In this article it has been argued that cheating the public revenue can be traced back to before Edward III. Indeed, at least, to the Laws of Henry I (c. 1113)(see 3);  However, in the case where the cheating was undertaken by important persons an additional means of prosecution started to come into play. Prosecution in Parliament.
Evidence of this can be seen in the reign of Edward II (1307-27). Further, it likely occurred because -in the case of Gaveston (1307) -the sovereign himself was involved (Gaveston being a favourite). Thus, attempts to prosecute him in the Exchequer or by judicial means would likely have been thwarted. 139 The device employed was to charge a person with High Crimes and Misdemeanours before Parliament.
 To an extent this was presaged by the reference in Britton in 1290 that, in the case of escheators, 'We reserve …judgments upon great offences committed by them to our own determnination'.(see 5(a)). Thus, cheating the revenue was -in important instances concerning 'great men' -not to be dealt with by the Exchequer but otherwise by the Crown;
 Further, at least since the Laws of Henry I, c. 1113, the general principle was that persons could only be judged by their peers.
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One of the first cases of 'High Crimes and Misdemeanours' comprised proceedings against Piers Gaveston in 1307. It was ordained in Parliament and confirmed by the king:
by the examination of prelates, earls, barons, knights, and other good people of the realm, it was found that Piers de Gaveston had evilly counselled the king, and had inticed him to do ill in divers manners; [these are then listed and included that] he cheated the king of his treasure, and sent it beyond sea…
(italics supplied)
In the case of Mortimer (1330), accused in Parliament of high treason, two of the articles exhibited against him declared: 6 th . The said Roger, by his usurped royal power, caused the king to give to him and his children, and confederates, castles, towns, manors, and franchises in England, Ireland, and Wales, in decrease of the revenues of the crown… 10 th The said Roger by his said usurped royal power, had caused to be taken from him [ie. Edward II, 1307-27] and his party, the king's treasure, as much as he pleased, without tale, in money and jewels, in destruction of the king, so that he had not wherewithal to pay for his victuals.
These cases are of 'High Crimes and Misdemeanours' (though they are not impeachments as such since they arose by way of accusation by the Crown -as opposed to accusation by the House of Commons followed by judgment by the House of Lords). 143 Other examples of High Crimes and Misdemeanours involving powerful men defrauding the revenue occurred at the end of the reign of Edward III (1327-77). 144 The following may be noted (they comprise cases of impeachment by the Commons and judgment by the Lords):
 Lyons (1376). 145 A London merchant, Lyons was a member of the privy council as well as a London alderman and a collector (farmer) of customs and subsidies since 1373. He was accused of 'deceits, extortions and other evil deeds' (disceites, extorsions et autres malx faits). Among other things he was impeached and accused (empeschez et accusez) of: (a) imposing and appropriating customs duties without the consent of Parliament;
146 (b) charging usurious levels of interest on loans to the Crown, including 50% on a loan of 20,000 marks to Edward III; 147 (c) buying up royal debts cheaply but obtaining full payment of them at the Exchequer. Found guilty, Lyons was imprisoned at the king's pleasure, his goods were forfeited and he was dismissed from his offices. Lyons was subsequently pardoned but never restored to office; 147 There was also an allegation that the loan comprised some of the sovereign's own money. 148 Lyons may have been pardoned through the influence of Alice Perrers, the mistress of Edward III, see n 144. However, it may have also been through the influence of John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, the third son of Edward III. 149 (a) purchasing royal debts (being exchequer tallies) owed to others at a fraction of their worth but obtaining full payment of them at the exchequer; (b) receiving payment in a greater sum than due for taking men-at-arms and archers to Brittany, France in 1372. 153 Found guilty, he was sentenced by the House of Lords to be removed from his offices and from the privy council, as well as being fined 8000 marks. In 1377, all penalties against him were set aside by Edward III. 155 and Lord Melville (1806) 156 comprise cases of important people seeking to defraud the public revenue in some way. However, a case noted by Coke, indicated that it could be a dangerous thing to falsely accuse a public officer of mis-using public money:
In 39 E [ie. 1364] Ralph Brantingham one of the chamberlains of the exchequer complained before the king and his council of Richard Cesterfield clerk deputy of the king's treasurer, in the receipt for divers allowances, payments etc unduly made, and for raising [erasing] of records etc. Upon hearing of the cause by the whole council, the defendant was acquitted, and the plaintiff removed from his office, and committed to prison.
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In conclusion, from, at least, 1307, defrauding the Exchequer was being punished in Parliament, in the case of great men, as a High Crime and Misdemeanour.
Early History of the Offence -Other Deceits
As will be seen (see 11), from the time of Hawkins -who wrote the first edition of his Treatise on the Pleas of the Crown in 1716-21 -cheating the revenue has been mixed up with a large number of other 'cheats' (deceits).
 153 This is almost the same as a case in 1353, see n 241. 154 He was impeached, among other things, for: (a) purchasing lands and other sources of royal income contrary to his oath and through their being under-valued; (b) obtaining royal confirmation of a purchase from a Hanseatic trader of a royal annuity which that trader had forfeited (in effect, the accusation was that Pole deceived the sovereign into allowing him an income to which he was not entitled, resulting in loss to the Crown); (c) procuring the revenue of a hospital which should have been taken by the Crown (the accusation was that the hospital revenue was for the sovereign, yet Pole had acquired a personal benefit at the loss to the Crown other 'cheats' which he referred to, comprised cheats on the general public in some way (breaches of the assizes of bread or beer etc). They were not the same as cheating the Crown, in terms of defrauding it of revenue. Further, the punishment was different. In the case of the former, the punishment was invariably the pillory. In the case of the latter it was never the pillory. Rather, it was fines (sometimes imprisonment as well), loss of land and loss of office;  This 'packaging' of Hawkins, however, was to be adopted by other legal writers such as in Russell's On Crimes and Misdemeanours, the first edition of which was in 1819 and the last in 1964. This 'packaging' only ended when the common law offence of cheating was abolished in the Theft Act 1968, with a saving for cheating the revenue (see 1);  Further, it should be noted that Hawkins -in the case of defrauding the public revenue -never referred to early law such as the Laws of Henry I. Nor to the practice of the Exchequer or the writings of Bracton, Britton, Fleta etc. Nor to High Crimes and Misdemeanours. Instead, Hawkins found the offence of defrauding the revenue virtually on the case of Treeve (1796) (see 14(b)). This also was unfortunate since -although the party defrauded in this case was the Crown -this offence -one of selling unwholesome (ie. rotten) food to the general public -was quite distinct from that of defrauding the revenue.
However, given the policy of Hawkins and its adoption by subsequent writers -and in order to understand how it came about and how 'cheating the revenue' was 'packaged' with other cheats -the early law on these other matters is now considered. The source (as may be expected) are the customs of the City of London -where the Mayor and Alderman developed a system of ordinances to prevent the public from being swindled in the case of basic necessities such as food, drink and clothing and where the 'mysteries' (trades, guilds) helped enforce these. First, as to the source material:
(a) City of London -Cheating -Sources
The City of London (the 'City') provides some of the earliest, and most common, examples of what Hawkins was, later (in 1716-21), to categorise as public 'cheats'. In respect of the City, the following relevant texts may be noted:  Letters of the City of London. 160 These comprise a series of folio volumes in manuscript on parchment. They contain entries of the current matters of the day in which the City was concerned. Published in 11 volumes, being Letterbooks A to I and then K to L, 161 they contain a wealth of detail on early frauds and deceits, punished by the Mayor and the alderman of the City at the Guildhall;  Riley. In a useful text, Memorials of London and London Life…AD 1276-1419, 162 Thomas Riley, a Victorian researcher, extracted material from the Letterbooks referred to above. Riley's text is referred to for the purposes of this article since it is sufficiently detailed to explain the nature of the 'deceits' (cheats) discussed without also citing the relevant passages in the Letterbooks;  Liber Albus. In 1419, John Capenter made a repertory (that is, a book of remembrances) of the then existing laws, observances, rights and franchises of the City, which is generally referred to as the Liber Albus (White Book 
(b) City of London -Cheating -Examples
The City in early medieval times was highly regulated, with many 'mysteries' (trades) and guilds. They oversaw standards -together with the Mayor and Aldermen of the City who imposed fines and the pillory in the case of infractions. Particularly regulated was anything to do with food, drink and clothing. Further, the pillory was a very visible means of punishing petty frauds committed by bakers, brewers etc since the public could then identity them and, indeed, pelt them with insults and rotten food. 168 All these infractions were later cited by Hawkins (in 1716-21) as examples of 'cheats' although that word did not come into usage until the 16 th century (being thieves' cant)(see 10(b)). Instead, in the times of the Plantagenets, the common words would have been 'deceites', 'malx faits' (evil deeds) and 'decepciones'. Thus the following may be noted:
 Assize of Bread. 169 From early times, there were legal provisions designed to safeguard the weightand quality -of bread, it being a staple food. Prior to 1297, defaulting bakers were drawn though the streets on a hurdle. 170 Indeed, this seems to have continued until, at least, 1437 (the hurdle being for the first offence and the pillory thereafter). 171 Bread that was deficient was forfeited. 170 Riley, n 162, p xli, 'on 30 th November 1297 'it was adjudged and ordered that the three beams, with their weights, newly ordained to weigh corn going to the mill, shall from henceforth be wholly abandoned; and that the hurdles on which bakers were drawn of late through the City, when convicted of selling false bread, that is, bread of insufficient weight, shall likewise be destroyed; the said bakers being from henceforth to have the punishment of the pillory.' See also Chronicles, n 167, p 43 (1258, bakers in tumbrel). 171 Ibid, p xlii. 172 Ibid, p 39, on 10 August, 1298, Juliana, the baker of Newington [Neytone] brought a cart laden with bread into the City (into West Chepe). Some of this was 'light' bread being 'wanting in weight, according to the assize of the halfpenny loaf, to the amount of 25 shillings' [in weight. The shilling of silver being three fifths of an ounce in weight, this deficiency was 15 ounces]. The defective bread was ordered to be given to the prisoners in Newgate. See also pp 71-2 (bread of Stratford seized as being deficient in weight). See also p 90. On 10 August 1311, an order was made for the arrest of a baker. It was asserted that his 'bread was putrid, and altogether rotten, and made of putrid wheat, so that persons by eating that bread would be poisoned and choked.' The sheriff was ordered to take the baker and bring him before the mayor and alderman,'to receive judgment for the same.' 173 Ibid, p 108 (charge of selling French bread of light weight), p 119 (light bread of deficient weight, punishment of the hurdle), p 121 (punishment for selling bread deficient in weight and of bad materials. 'bread of theirs made of false, putrid, and rotten materials; through which, persons who bought such bread were deceived, and might be killed.' Therefore, they were handed over for punishment by the pillory), p 122 (bread of deficient weight), p 498 (inserting iron into a loaf of bread to add to its weight). 174 eg. Ibid, p 180 (1331) 'Whereas the bakers of this city do withdraw themselves from the same, and hide in the mills and elsewhere in the foreign [ie. parts beyond the City and its liberties], to escape the punishment which they ought to have for their false loaves; and do put in their place their men and others who so make the loaves, false as to the weight and as to the dough thereof, the which things have not been permitted heretofore, -to the great damage and deceit of all the people. ' 177 See eg Riley, n 162, p 69 (In 1309, the small beam for weighing silk and spices, which belonged to the chamber of the City of London was let to Edmund le Lorimer [Edmund, the Lorimer] at a rent of £10 pa. 'And the aforesaid Edmund makes oath that he will give lawful weight to every one, and that he will faithfully do all other things which unto the said office pertain.'). See also, pp 72-4. The effect of the grant of the keepership of the small beam was that a person could then collect the fees for the weighing of goods and spices. and ales they sold. Sellers of unsound wine were sometimes made to drink it as well as being pilloried. 185 Hucksters of ale were also pilloried;
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 Fish. Dorsers -baskets in which fish were carried on packhorses (they were required to be of such a size as to hold one bushel of oats) -were regulated. Defective dorsers were destroyed and the fish forfeited. 187 The pillory was imposed for selling putrid fish. 188 Unlawful fish nets (kedels) were condemned to be burnt; 189  Meat. Punishment of the pillory was usual for the selling of putrid beef 190 by virtue of the common law. And what, today, would be described as selling by way of mis-description or fraudulent mis-representation were categorised under a generic concept of 'deceites' (frauds). They are all examples of swindling. It is important to note that these deceits were different from cheating the public revenue for the following reasons:  They derived from the law of common nuisance. Thus, the punishment was the pillory or thewe. In contrast, cheating the public revenue was a misprision and it derived from the law on contempt of the sovereign. Thus, the punishment was fine (sometimes imprisonment), loss of lands and, sometimes, loss of office;  Cheats against the public were judged by the Mayor and Alderman of the City of London. In contrast, cheating the public revenue was judged by the Exchequer courts or the King's Bench;  Cheats against the public were committed by commission but not by omission. Contrariwise, cheating the public revenue was a misprision and could be committed by omission.
In conclusion, in the City of London, from medieval times, persons were punished by the pillory for a whole range of deceits (cheats) which had the effect of swindling the general public. These deceits were different from cheating the public revenue.
False Tokens -1541
For a long time the offence of cheating (ie defrauding persons in certain contexts) comprised only a common law offence. However, in 1541, statute entered the field with an 'Act concerning Counterfeit Letters or Privy Tokens 202 to receive Money or Goods in other Men's Names' (spelling modernised). 203 The purpose of the Act was recited in its Preamble:
For as much as many light and evil-disposed persons, not minding to get their living by truth according to the laws of this realm, but compassing and devising daily how they may unlawfully obtain and get into their hands and possession goods, chattels, and jewels of other persons, for the maintenance of their unthrifty living, and also knowing that if they came to any of the same goods, chattels, and jewels by stealth, that then they, being thereof lawfully convicted according to the laws of this realm shall die, therefore, have now of late falsely and deceitfully contrived, devised, and imagined privy tokens and counterfeit letters in other men's names, unto divers persons their special friends and acquaintances, for the obtaining of money, goods, chattels, and jewels of the same persons, their friends and acquaintances, by colour whereof the said light and evil disposed persons have deceitfully and unlawfully obtained and gotten great substance of money, goods, chattels, and jewels into their hands and possession, contrary to right and conscience:
For the reformation whereof it is enacted…that if any person or persons… falsely and deceitfully obtain or get into his or their hands or possession, any money, goods, chattels, jewels, or other things of any other person or persons, by colour or means of any such false token, or counterfeit letter made in any other man's name, [then, punishment of pillory or other corporal punishment except death].(spelling modernised).
This legislation of 1541 was one of the first to directly deal with a crime relating to deception and it initiated the process of the law punishing the acquiring of money and property by false pretences 204 -one latter extended by an Act of 1757 (obtaining money by false pretences) 205 and an Act of 1812 (obtaining bonds etc under false pretences). 206 Hawkins noted:
The common law punishing only those cheats which were effected by means of false public tokens, or by conspiracy or by forgery, or which effected the public interest, the statute of Henry the 8 th (ie. the Act of 1541) went further, and punished those cheats which were effected by means of ' 210 Two other matters may be referred to with regard to this period:
(a) Cheating the Revenue -Misprision
It is asserted this offence was (and is) a misprision. Coke said of misprision:
Misprision is twofold: one is crimen omissionis, of omission, as in concealment, or not discovery of treason or felony; another is crimen commissionis, of commission, as in committing some heinous offence under the degree of felony. Or [of] misprision is of two sorts, viz passive and active: passive is of the nature of the concealment, whereof some be by the common law, and some by statute.
(spelling modernised)
Similarly, Blackstone said as to misprision:
Misprisions (a termed derived from the old French, mespris, a neglect or contempt) are, in the acceptation of our law, generally understood to be all such high offences as are under the degree of capital, but nearly bordering thereon: …Misprisions are generally divided into two sorts; negative, which consist in the concealment of something which ought to be revealed; and positive, which consist in the commission of something which ought not to be done. 212 An offence allied to cheating the public revenue which was also a misprision was misconduct in a public or judicial office.
(b) Meaning -Cheat
In early times, the word commonly used to describe cheating the revenue was 'deceite'. liable to be prosecuted and punished in a like manner as if they had knowingly and designedly, by false pretence or pretences, obtained any goods, wares, or merchandizes, from any person or persons, with intent to cheat or defraud any person or persons of the same.' The punishment was the pillory. See Hawkins (1824 ed), n 10, vol 1, p 321 who referred to R v Young [see n 251] where Buller J 'says that the offence within the statute is 'the obtaining by false pretences with intention to defraud', that if the intent were made out, and the false pretence used to effect it, the case was brought within the statute.' 207 Hawkins (1824 ed), n 10, vol 1, pp 320-1.
 This is unsurprising since the Oxford English Dictionary indicates that the word 'cheat' only came into use post 1530 and that it (probably) derives from thieves' cant (speech), referring to a stolen article; 214  However, the word 'cheat', as a verb, was -when in general usage -employed as a synonym for 'to defraud' 215 and one would suggest that -today -this would be a more intelligible word to use.
As to the word 'cheat', one assumes that -from thieves' cant -it percolated into more general use and, then, was used in court and by legal writers in due course. In the case of the former, in Orbell (1703) the word 'cheat' is used. 216 In the case of the latter, Hale CJ -in The History of the Pleas of the Crown 217 written c 1640's -in a chapter entitled 'Of Larceny, and its kinds', referring to the Act of 1541(see 9), stated:
If A comes to B and by a false message or token receives money of him, and carries it away, it is no felony, but a cheat punishable by indictment at common law, or upon the statute of 33 H 8 cap 1 [ie. the Act of 1541, see 9] by setting in the pillory.
(italics supplied)
This appears to be an early use of the word 'cheat' in the legal textbooks.
In conclusion, the word 'cheat' came in to legal use to cover what the Anglo-Norman word 'deceite' embraced in medieval times.
Hawkins -Pleas of the Crown: 1716-21 & 1824
The first systematic analysis of the concept of 'cheating' appears to have been Hawkins who -in the first edition of his Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown (1716-21) -considered the offence 'Of Cheats'. He observed:
Of cheats punishable by public prosecution, there are two kinds, 1. By the common law. 2. By the statute.
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Hawkins 'packaged' together a number of disparate examples of cheat, culled from the law reports. Thus, he stated:
And first it seemeth, that those which are punishable at common law, may in general be described to be deceitful practices in defrauding or endeavouring to defraud another of his known right by means of some artful device contrary to the plain rules of common honesty.
Hawkins then cited various examples by reference to the caselaw:
220
 Playing with false dice;
 Causing an illiterate person to execute a deed to his prejudice, by reading it over to him in words different from those in which it was written;  Persuading a woman to execute writings to another (as her trustee upon an intended marriage), which in truth contains no such thing, but only a warrant of attorney to confess a judgment etc;  Suppressing a will; . 'Cheatours' (or 'Fingerers') was a reference, in particular, to card sharpers which is why cases discussed by legal writers often included references to false dice and other gaming tricks, by which the general public were fleeced. See also the Early English Text referred to previously, p 7 (description of a cheatour or fingerer in J Awdeley (printer), The Fraternitye of Vacabondes (1575)). 215 OED (to cheat), n 128, '2. To defraud, to deprive of by deceit. 3a To deceive, impose upon, trick. B.To lead into (action) by deception. 4. To deal fraudulently, practice deceit.' See also J Cowell, A Law Dictionary or the Interpreter (London, 1708) 'Deceptio, fraus, dolus, is a subtle, wily shift or device, having no other name. Hereto may be drawn all manner of craft, subtilty, guile, fraud, wileness, slight, cunning, covin, collusion, practice and offence us'd to deceive another man by any means, with hath none other proper or particular name, but offence.' Cowell cited W West, Symboleography (London, 1641), pt 2, section 68 'Enough of named offences, it remains that we view those which be unnamed…Deceit is a subtle wily shift or device having none other name. Hereunto may be drawn all manner of craft, subilty, guile, fraud, wileliness, sleightness, cunning, covin, collusion, deceit, device, practice, and offence used to deceive another man by any means, which has none other proper or particular name but offence.' (wording modernized). Cowell's definition was repeated in T Blount, A Law Dictionary and Glossary (3 rd ed, 1717). 216 R v Orbell (1703) 6 Mod 42(87 ER 804). In an indictment for cheating in a footrace 'The court would not grant it [the indictment] upon motion, for they said, that being a cheat, though it was private, in the particular, yet it was publick in its consequences.' (italics supplied) 217 See n 11. 218 Ibid, vol 2, p 506. 219 In the case of statute, Hawkins cited the Act of 1541 (see 9).  Acknowledging an action in a person's name without his privity, and against his will.
It may be noted there was no reference to 'Cheating the Public Revenue' in this, the first edition of Hawkins, nor in the examples referred to. 221 Nor was there mention in the 6th edition of his work, in 1788. For the final edition of Hawkins (in 1824) where reference was made to cheating the public revenue, see 15(b).
In conclusion, Hawkins dealt with cheating both at common law and pursuant to legislation. However, he did not discuss cheating -in the context of cheating the public revenue -until after East had considered this in 1803 (see 14).
Blackstone (1769)
Blackstone, in the fourth volume of his Commentaries on the Laws of England (in 1769), in a chapter on 'public wrongs', stated:
Cheating is another offence, more immediately against public trade; as that cannot be carried on without a punctilious regard to common honesty, and faith between man and man. Hither therefore may be referred that prodigious multitude of statutes, which are made to prevent deceits in particular trades, and which are chiefly of use among the traders themselves. For so cautious has the legislature been, and so thoroughly abhors all indirect practices, that there is hardly a considerable fraud incident to any branch of trade, but what is restrained and punished by some particular statute.
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Blackstone then went on to mention breaking the assize of bread, 223 as well as false weights and measures 224 and he noted the punishment. 225 Blackstone continued:
Lastly, any deceitful practice, in cozening 226 another by artful means, whether in matters of trade or otherwise, as by playing with false dice, or the like, is punishable with fine, imprisonment, and pillory.
And by the statutes 33 Hen VIII c 1 and 30 Geo II c 24 [see 9] if any man defrauds another of any valuable chattels by colour of any false token, counterfeit letter, or false pretence, or pawns or disposes of another's goods without the consent of the owner, he shall suffer such punishment by imprisonment, fine, pillory, transportation, whipping, or other corporal pain, as the court shall direct.
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In conclusion, Blackstone did not deal with cheats affecting the public revenue but only with cheating individuals and the general public.
Bembridge (1783) (a) Locus Classicus
This case 228 is an important one in that it has been cited as the locus classicus in the context of: (ii) false accounting;
(iii) cheating the public revenue.
The case is a good example of all three and it indicates that -in 1783 -these common law offences had not become independent offences as they are today. Further, (ii) is covered, today, by the Theft Act 1968, s 17 (false accounting).
(b) The Case -Historical Background
In this case, the defendant -an accountant in the office of the Receiver and Paymaster General of the Forcesdeceitfully (ie. corruptly) 229 concealed from his superior his knowledge that certain sums which should have been inserted into a final account were omitted (the sum was a debt of £48,000 owed by Holland to the public, that is, the Exchequer). 230 The case appears opaque unless some historical background is understood.
 Henry Fox, 1st Baron Holland (1705-74), the father of Charles James Fox the politician, was appointed Paymaster General of the Forces in the period 1757-65 when he was forced to resign. He was said to have amassed some £50,000 a year from the office in his eight years there. 231 Proceedings against Fox were brought in the Court of Exchequer. However, they were delayed by a Royal warrant. Further, Fox proved that -in the delay in making up the accounts in his office -he had not broken the law. However, from the interest on the outstanding balances, he made a fortune;  The gist of the case was that Powell and Bembridge failed to close Holland's account for many years (ie. 1774-83), the effect of which would have been to show that a large sum was owing to the Exchequer (ie. the balance on the account was £48,000 less than it actually was). 236 Further, that Bembridge knowingly and fraudulently failed to disclose the omission in the supposed 'final' account;  The fact that no loss was actually incurred (or could be incurred) was strongly asserted by counsel for Bembridge. 237 Although this was not specifically discussed by Mansfield CJ in his judgment, this was irrelevant since the offence was (and is) a misprision (see 10(a)). Thus -as well as being able to occur by omission as commission -the conduct is the thing that is punished (being a contempt of the sovereign), not the consequence of the conduct.
(d) The Case -Judgment
Giving judgment in the case, Mansfield CJ stated: 239 The duty of the defendant is obvious; he was a trustee for the public and the paymaster, for making every charge and every allowance he knew of…If the defendant knew of the omission…if he concealed it, his motive must have been corrupt. That he did know was fully proved, and he was guilty therefore, not of an omission or neglect, but of a gross deceit.
[fraud] The object could only have been to defraud the public of the whole, or part of the interest …
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Here there are two principles applicable: first, that a man accepting an office of trust concerning the public, especially if attended with profit; is answerable criminally to the king for misbehaviour in his office; this is true, by whomever and whatever way the officer is appointed… Secondly, where there is a breach of trust, fraud, or imposition, in a matter concerning the public, though as between individuals it would only be actionable, yet as between the king and the subject it is indictable. That such should be the rule is essential to the existence of the country.
An indictment has been sustained for concealing public money, 27 Ass pl 17, 241 though this, as against a private person, would only have been actionable. 242 The rule is well laid down by Mr Serj. Hawkins 243 that all kinds of crimes of a public nature, all misdemeanours whatsoever of a public evil example against the common law may be indicted; but no injuries of a private nature, unless they some way concern the king. So it is laid down in an Anonymous case, 244 that any public officer is indictable for misbehaviour in his office. No doubt the offices concerning the revenue are of great importance to the public' 245 (italics supplied)
In conclusion, Bembridge is principally a decision on false accounting. However, since it concerned a public officer, it is also an offence relating to misconduct by a public officer. Finally, since it related to the public 237 22 ST 150 'the public will never suffer either by the default of Mr Bembridge or Mr Powell, for there are standing securities for the balance of all lord Holland's accounts, amounting to upwards of 100,000 pounds, upon landed security, the same securities that they stood upon at the time of lord Holland's death; it is perfectly clear, therefore, that the public cannot lose by this.' 238 See n 212 (mespris, contempt).
revenue, it is also a case of cheating the public revenue. 246
East (1803)
East -in the only edition of his Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown (1803), 247 -drew a distinction between larceny and cheats. In the latter case, the owner intended to dispose of the absolute property in the goods in question. 248 However, East also noted that: the intent in both instances being dishonestly to acquire and convert to his own use the property of another without any or an adequate consideration.
(italics supplied)
East then went on to consider various forms of cheat. He analysed 'false tokens' 250 (the law on this is no longer relevant) 251 and then doubted whether Hawkins' definition of the offence of cheating 252 was sufficient, or distinct, to be taken as a definition of the offence at common law. He stated:
I should rather say that it consists in the fraudulent obtaining the property of another by any deceitful or illegal practice or token (short of felony) which affects or may affect the public.
(b) Public Cheats
In respect of this, East discussed false weights and measures 254 and then cheats against public justice, stating:
There is also another head of public cheats, indictable at common law, which are levelled against the public justice of the kingdom. Such as the doing judicial acts without authority in the name of another. But most of these are now made felony by the statutes 21 Jac 1 c 26 and 4 W & M c 4. 255 There is precedent of an indictment against a married woman for pretending to be a widow, and as such executing a bail-bond to the sheriff for one arrested on a bailable writ. This perhaps was considered as a fraud upon a public officer in the course of justice.
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East continued:
So all frauds affecting the crown and the public at large are indictable, though arising out of a particular transaction or contract with the party. This is admitted by the very terms of the objection in the 246 Mansfield CJ's analysis (one would assert) was wholly in accordance with early English law. Cheating the revenue was a contempt against the sovereign (against his Exchequer). It was a misprision which could be committed by way of omission or commission. Further, it required neither deception or a loss to be proved. See, for example, the cases cited in 7. 247 EH East, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown (1803) reprinted by the Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 248 Ibid, vol 2, p 816 ''Upon reviewing the authorities there collected it will appear that the distinction so far as regards the subject of the present inquiry turns mainly upon the consideration whether or not the owner deceived by appearances intended to part with the absolute property, and not barely with the possession or temporary use of the thing at the time of the delivery, rather than upon any actual difference in the degree of fraud meditated by the taker…' 249 Ibid. 250 See, in particular, the Act of 1541 (see 9). 251 He stated 'It is not however every species of fraud or dishonesty in transactions between individuals which is the subject matter of a criminal charge at common law; but in order to constitute it such, according to the doctrine in Wheatly's Case, Young's case, and other authorities, it must be such as affects the public; such as is public in its nature, calculated to defraud numbers, to deceive the people in general. And this is instanced not only by precedents of cheats effected by conspiracy, to which may be added forgery, which are in themselves substantive offences, though the cheats thereby intended be not fully carried into effect; but also, as is stated generally, by such as effected by means of false tokens. Yet these latter being also, put by way of example, must still, as it seems, be understood of such false tokens as affect the public at large, such as are calculated to defraud numbers, to deceive the people in general; of which the common instance referred to is the cheating by means of false weights and measures, against which it is said that ordinary care or prudence is not sufficient to guard. It does not distinctly appear that the instances so put in argument, of cheats effected by means of false tokens generally, were intended to be applied indiscriminately to offences at common law as well as by statute; but such expressions seem rather to have been used concerning cheats in general which were the subject matter of an indictment, which would of course comprehend those included in the stat. 33 H 8 [ie. Act of 1541, see 9].' For Wheatly's case see 2 Burr 1125 (97 ER 746) (1761) and, for Young's case, see 3 TR 104 (100 ER 475)(1789). 252 Hawkins had stated: 'That it consists in 'deceitful practices in defrauding or endeavouring to defraud another of his known right by means of some artful device contrary to the plain rules of common honesty'. See 11. 253 East, n 247, p 818. 254 Ibid, p 820. 'But if in any of these cases the cheat be effected by means of false weights or measures, (which are known public tokens) it is then clearly indictable; for these betoken a general design to defraud; they are instruments or tokens purposely calculated for deceit, and by which the public in general may be imposed upon without any imputation of folly or negligence…To [ East then went on to cite the following case:
Treeve (1796). 258 The indictment charged that Treeve (a common brewer and a Government contractor) knowingly, wilfully, deceitfully and maliciously did provide, furnish and deliver to and for 800 French prisoners of war in a prison near Plymouth, 500 pounds of bread, for food. And that the bread was unfit for consumption, making the prisoners ill to the great discredit of the lord the king, to the evil example etc and against the peace etc. After conviction it was objected -in arrest of judgment -that the offence as laid was not indictable since it did not appear that it was done in breach of contract with the public or of any moral or civil duty. The judges upheld the conviction. 259 It is clear that East was not citing this case as one of cheating the public revenue but, rather, as one of the cheating the general public.
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East went on to mention the following case which is a good example of cheating the public revenue:
Jones (1777). 261 The indictment charged that Jones (an apprentice) was bound by indenture to serve one Lucas (a jobbing smith) for the remainder of a term of 7 years and that -intending fraudulently and unjustly to obtain money from the paymaster of HM's 7 th regiment of foot to defraud the king of divers sums of money -Jones, unlawfully, fraudulently and deceitfully caused and procured himself without the consent of Lucas to be enlisted by means of which he unlawfully, fraudulently and deceitfully obtained payment, knowing himself to be disqualified from serving without his master's consent, to the great deceit, fraud and damage to the king, and against the peace etc. The indenture was produced but not the subscribing witnesses 'which upon reference to the judges after conviction was holden to be necessary in order to warrant the conviction.'
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East then went on to discuss private cheats. Finally, East considered the Act of 1541 (see 9) and subsequent legislation relating to it.
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In conclusion, East was the first legal writer to discuss cheats affecting the Crown as such -as opposed to the general public. In this, Jones (1777) is relevant since it concerns defrauding the Crown, via an army paymaster. Treeve (1796), however, is an example of the offence of supplying unwholesome food to the public. Such an offence was committed whether the supplier was a Government contractor or not. Thus, Treeve does not directly relate to cheating the public revenue -although it was often cited by subsequent legal writers in that context.
Russell (1819) (a) Russell
Russell -in the first edition of his text On Crimes and Misdemanours, in 1819 264 -considered cheats in general (the law on this is no longer relevant).
265 Then, after considering cheats which are 'levelled against the public 257 Ibid. 258 Cornwall, Summer Assize 1796 (unreported). For an early precedent to this see Riley, n 162, pp 536-7. On 27 June 1394, one William Whitman was brought before the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of London for selling to a merchant old roots and rotten powders for good powdered ginger and other worthless material for genuine wormseed (artemisia santonica). A jury held him guilty of deceit and falsehood. He was placed in the pillory. The material was burnt. 259 See also Turner, n 17, vol 2, pp 1157-8. 260 East, n 247, vol 2, stated, p 822 'The defendant…was in fact a contractor with the government for the supplying of provisions to the French prisoners in the neighbourhood of Plymouth in the course of the then war; though that was not stated in the indictment on which the conviction took place. Nor was it material so to state it, otherwise than as a matter of aggravation if such a case wanted any: for the giving of any person unwholesome victuals not fit for man to eat, lucri causa, or from malice or deceit, is undoubtedly in itself an indictable offence, apart from any other consideration, which entered deeply into the demerits of the defendant's conduct.' (italics supplied) 261 Coventry Lent Assizes, 1777 (reported).
262 East, n 247, vol 2, p 822. 263 Ibid, pp 826-7. 264 Russell n 13. For a useful summary see also, R Burn (ed G Chetwynd), The Justice of the Peace and Parish Officer (London, 1820), vol 1, pp 467-80 (Cheat). Burn treated embezzlement as part of cheat. 265 Ibid, vol 2, p 1360 'Where the possession of goods is obtained, in the first instance, without fraud, upon a contract or trust, a subsequent dishonest conversion of them, while the privity of contract continues undetermined, will only be a breach of trust or civil injury, and not the subject of a criminal prosecution. But where the party obtaining the goods has recourse to fraudulent means in the first instance, and thereby succeeds to the extent of inducing the owner not only to deliver the possession of the goods to him, but absolutely to part with the property in them, though such a taking will not, as we have seen be considered as felonious and amounting to larceny; yet if effected by means of a false token, or a false pretence, it will come within the provisions of certain statutes, and be punishable as a misdemeanour. Besides the statutes also which relate to such offences, the common law provides for the punishment of many of those cheats and frauds which may affect the public justice of the kingdom' which were 'indictable at common law', 266 Russell continued:
Those frauds which affect the crown and the public at large, are also clearly the subject of indictment, though they may arise in the course of some particular transaction or contract with private individuals. Amongst offences of this description, is the selling of unwholesome provisions. And it is said, more largely, that the giving of any person unwholesome victuals, not fit for man to eat, lucri causa, or from malice or deceit, is undoubtedly, in itself, an indictable offence.
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In respect of the latter, Russell cited Treeve (1796). 268 Russell then stated:
In some cases the rendering false accounts and other frauds practised by persons in official situations, have been deemed offences so affecting the public as to be indictable. Thus, where two persons were indicted for enabling persons to pass their accounts with the pay office in such a way as to enable them to defraud the government; and it was objected that it was only a private matter of account, and not indictable; the court held otherwise, as it related to the public revenue.
[ie. Bembridge]
And instances appear in books of indictments against overseers of the poor for refusing to account, pursuant to a statutory duty to do so. The court held that their refusal to do so was a contempt of the law for which they might be indicted for a cheat.
[ie. Commings]
And a precedent is given of an indictment [in 1799] against a surveyor of the highways (from the Crown Office) for converting to his own use gravel which had been dug at the expense of the inhabitants of the parish, and also employing for his own private gain and emolument the labourers and teams of the parishioners, which he ought to have employed in repairing the highways.
[ie. Robinson] (wording divided for ease of reference).
Russell also referred to Jones (1777) (see 14(b)) observing that such an offence was now punishable under the Mutiny Acts.
(b) Hawkins -Last Edition
It may also be noted that the last edition of Hawkins (1824) closely followed East. It stated:
So it is said all frauds affecting the crown and public at large are indictable as cheats at common law, as in the following case…
Hawkins then referred to Treeve (1796) as well as to Jones (1777), citing East. 273 Thus, the source for the modern proposition on cheating the public revenue is actually East (in 1803) and not Hawkins 274 -although subsequent writers (and the courts) have tended to present Hawkins as the source, when this is not so.
In conclusion, the primary decisions which Russell cited in respect of cheating the public revenue were Bembridge (1783) and Jones (1777). The last edition of Hawkins then adopted the general propostion of East, re-casting it slightly.
Gabbett (1843), Harris (1881), Stephen (1883)
As to later legal writers and their commentary on the law of cheat, Gabbett - Several cases of malversation by public officers have been held to be indictable, as frauds and cheats of a public nature. Thus where Bembridge and Powell [1783] were indicted for enabling persons to pass their accounts with the pay office in such a way as to enable them to defraud the government, it was objected that it was only a private matter of account, and not indictable; but the court held otherwise, as it related to the public revenue. 276 And in Tarrant's case [in 1767] an information was granted against an overseer of the poor of the parish of H for procuring a poor man of the parish of W to marry a single woman with child of a bastard, in order to get the bastard settled in the parish of W where the husband was settled, and thus relieve his own parish from the burden of maintaining the pauper, and throw it on the other.
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And a precedent may be referred to [Robinson, in 1799] of an indictment against a surveyor of the highways for converting to his own use gravel which had been dug at the expense of the inhabitants of the parish, and also employing, for his own private gain and emolument, the labourers and teams of parishioners, which he ought to have employed in repairing the highways. 278 And it is general principle that all frauds affecting the crown and the public are indictable though arising out of a particular transaction or contract with the party. And upon this principle apprentices have been held to be indictable, who enlist without the consent of their masters; such apprentices, at the time of receiving the bounty or enlisting money, knowing themselves to be disqualified from serving as soldiers without such consent, and thereby defrauding the king 279 …[ie. Jones] (wording divided for ease of reference) 280 Harris -in his Principles of the Criminal Law in 1881 -did not deal with defrauding the revenue as such. 281 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, in his Digest of the Criminal Law in 1883, 282 defined 'cheating' (art 338) 283 but did not deal with cheating the public revenue. 284 In conclusion, Gabbett dealt with cheating the public revenue, Harris and Stephen did not.
Bradbury & Edlin (1920), J (1933) (a) Bradbury & Edlin (1920)
In this case 285 -one which effectively revived the offence of cheating the public revenue after Bembridge (1783) -the defendant was charged with:
 Conspiracy to cheat and defraud the king of money due in respect of income tax, excess profits duty and super tax by making false statements and returns;  Making false statements in returns of income tax contrary to the Perjury Act 1911, s 5(b) 286 and;
 Delivering false returns tending to prejudice the king and the public revenue with intent to defraud the king contrary to the common law.
Of the charges laid at common law, 5 were alternative charges to those laid under the Perjury Act 1911 and two related to the submission of false trading and profit and loss accounts of the business of a company of which both the defendants were directors. Bray J, after dealing with the statutory position, considered the common law offence. He stated:
There are other counts charging them with the offences under the common law. Count 3 is an instance, in which the defendants are charged with making a false statement with intent to prejudice the public revenue contrary to the common law, and then it gives particulars of the offence. It is said that that is not an offence known to the law, that it is not within the common law of England. It certainly struck me, when the argument was made, that if it was not an offence it was quite time that it was made an offence.
But the common law of England is based on common sense, and it seems to me to be eminently in accord with common sense that when a person commits an offence of this kind, and makes a false statement with a view to prejudicing his Majesty's revenue, it ought to be punishable…In my view it is an indictable offence because it comes within the class of case of which one or two have been cited today.
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All these cases affecting the Crown and the public at large are indictable, and in my opinion, therefore, these common law counts stand, save for one other argument. By s 178 of the Income Tax Act 1842 it is provided that if there is such a fraudulent representation a certain penalty is provided... It is suggested that because there was an additional penalty imposed upon persons who offended against the Act, in their having to pay treble the duty evaded, that that repealed the common law of England.
In my opinion it certainly did not. It added an additional burden or obligation if you like, but it never did take away the right to proceed against an offender by indictment under the common law of England, and therefore these objections fail, and the defendants must proceed.
(wording divided for ease of reference) (b) Rex v J (1931)
This was a Northern Ireland case. 289 An indictment against the defendant for defrauding the Revenue alleged that he -unlawfully, with intent to defraud and to the prejudice of the king and the Commissioners of Inland Revenue -delivered to the latter a return for the assessment to super tax falsely stating his total income from all sources, less charges, which figure was false since the actual figure largely exceeded that sum which he well knew at the time and he did so falsely pretend. There were 5 similar counts for subsequent years. The defendant contended there was no such offence at common law. However, the indictment was held good.
 288 At pp 263-4. 289 (1931) Northern Ireland Law Reports 73. The trial was before Andrews LJ presiding at the Belfast City Commission. 290 The defendant was a storekeeper in Antigua in the West Indies. The principal charge on which the information was founded was that he had purchased, in England, certain stores at a nominal price. On this price (which had been arranged between him and the seller) he had received a considerable allowance, which allowance he took for his own use, by which the Government was defrauded to a considerable extent. The case mainly concerned whether the court of King's Bench had jurisdiction. The defendant was found guilty. The offence being of a very serious nature, D was remanded. A note provided that 'the sentence of the court has not yet been pronounced.' 291 2 East 5, 21 (102 ER 269). The case concerned the soliciting of a servant to steal from his master. However, obiter, Lawrence J, at p 21, stated that 'all offences of a public nature, that is, all such acts or attempts as tend to the prejudice of the community, are indictable.' 292 [1905] 2 KB 730. An indictment against two defendants for conspiracy alleged that they had unlawfully conspired to obtain a passport in the name of one of the defendants from the Foreign Secretary by falsely pretending and representing that that defendant desired to use th passport himself while travelling in Russia with intent that the passport should be used by another person in the name of that defendant, and that the defendants in pursuance of the conspiracy sent the passport to the other person for use by him in Russia, in fraud of the Foreign Office regulations for the issue of passports, to the injury and prejudice and disturbance of the lawful, free and customary intercourse between the subjects of the king and those of the Czar of Russia, to the public mischief of the subjects of the king, and to the endangerment of the continuance of the peaceful relations between the king and the Czar and their subjects respectively. It was held that the indictment was good.
In the case, Andrews LJ stated:
In my opinion, it is a common law offence to defraud the king of his revenue. It has always been a misdemeanour to make a false statement for the purpose of depriving the king of any part of his revenue; and making deliberately a false return for the purpose of defrauding the revenue is, merely, what I may call a modern illustration of that principle. It is an offence under the common law, quite apart from any created by Act of Parliament.
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As to whether the Income Tax Act 1918, s 224 (which prescribed a penalty) had taken away by statute any common law offence, in so far as it related to the making of false returns for revenue purposes, Andrews LJ stated:
It has been argued that statute cannot take away the right of the king at common law. In my opinion, not only has the right not been taken away, but it has been expressly preserved. I say this for two reasons. In the first place that is not a new offence created by statute; and, therefore, when we find that a remedy is provided in the Finance Acts, the king is not thereby deprived of his remedy at common law. The second reason for my opinion is founded on the express words in section 224 of the Income Tax Act, 1918, which provides that the provisions of that Act 'shall not affect any criminal proceedings for any felony or misdemeanour'. Therefore, no enactment which provides for the imposition of treble charge or for power to have the matter considered at petty sessions, in any way interferes with the common law rights of the king. The opinion I have expressed is in accordance with the decision of Bray J in Rex v Bradbury & Edlin…(see 17(a)).
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In conclusion, Bradbury and Edlin as well as Rex v J confirmed that the offence of cheating the public revenue existed at common law. This is unsurprising since this offence existed -at least -in 1376 and, indeed, prior to that.
Cross and Jones (1949), Harris (1950)
Cross and Jones -in their Introduction to Criminal Law, the second edition of which was in 1949 -did not deal with cheating the revenue or, indeed, discuss cheating in any detail. 296 Nor did Harris, in the eighteenth edition of the work in 1950. 297 Smith and Hogan -in the first edition of their Criminal Law in 1965 298 -stated:
Cheating is a misdemeanour at common law 299 and is punishable by imprisonment. 300 The offence was developed most vigorously during the eighteenth century and when the authorities are examined it immediately becomes clear that it needs a large and liberal definition to encompass them all.
301
They went on to analyse: (a) personation; (b) selling food unfit for human consumption 302 and (c) defrauding by means of false tokens and devices. Finally, they stated: 293 3 B & Ald 161, 163 (106 ER 621). It was held that a statute (9 & 10 Will 3 c 32 (1697), rep) had not altered the common law as to the offence of blasphemy but only given a cumulative punishment. Abbot CJ stated at p 163, 'Now I take it to be a general rule, that where there is a misdemeanour at common law, a statute providing a particular punishment for it does not repeal the common law.' See also Best J, at p 165 'It has long been a settled maxim, that neither the provisions of the common or statute law are abrogated but by the express words of an Act of Parliament, or by subsequent enactments, so inconsistent with the previous law as to raise 297 Harris, n 281 (1950 ed) simply observed, at p 340, 'A public cheat is an indictable misdemeanour at common law and consists in the use of some fraudulent device either: (i) to prevent the administration of public justice; or (ii) to induce the owner of goods or money to part with his property in them. In the case of a cheat against a private individual it is necessary to prove that the act has been completed and that there has been an injury to the individual: in the first class of cases, however, neither of these elements is essential and therefore the mere preparation of false evidence to mislead a tribunal is a misdemeanour, even though the evidence is not used. Other instances, such as false accounting by a public officer and frauds in connection with enlistment, are now covered by other statutory provisions, but one instance which is very much alive appears from Hudson [see 19]. Here the Court of Criminal Appeal upheld D's conviction on a charge of making false statements to the prejudice of the Crown and the public revenue with intent to defraud, where it appeared D had falsely stated to the Inland Revenue the profits of his business. It was argued that the indictment disclosed no offence known to law, but the court, relying on dicta of Lord Mansfield CJ, in Bembridge, and statements by Hawkins and East held that it was an offence for a private individual, as well as a public officer, to defraud the Crown and the public.
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In conclusion, Smith and Hogan considered cheating the public revenue. However, Cross and Jones and Harris did not.
Hudson (1956) 304
A taxpayer was convicted on 8 counts of an indictment charging him with making false statements to the prejudice of the Crown and the public revenue with intent to defraud.
305
 The indictment alleged that he caused to be submitted to an income tax inspector, with intent to defraud, accounts showing the profits of his business over a number of years to be substantially less than they, in fact, were and by delivering to the inspector a certificate of disclosure of facts relating to his tax liability which was false, to his knowledge;  The casenote noted that the facts disclosed a fraud on the sovereign and that a fraud by an individual on the sovereign or the public (which were synonymous terms) was an indictable misdemeanour at common law. Also, that the taxpayer -by sending to the inspector of taxes documents which were false and fraudulent to his knowledge for the purpose of avoiding the payment of tax -had defrauded the Crown and the public and was, therefore, properly, convicted of the offences charged.
then been used by the Board of Inland Revenue for some two or three years), Bray J held, without any hesitation apparently, that the facts disclosed a common law misdemeanour. This form of indictment has been used ever since by the Board of Inland Revenue where the offence charged is that of submitting false accounts. It has been challenged once or twice, but it has never been challenged after conviction by being brought up to this court. It seems to me perfectly clear that the communis opinio among lawyers has been that Bray J's decision was right, and I cannot see any ground upon which we can say that the authorities upon which he acted, and upon which we are acting today, have ever been limited or dissented from. In Northern Ireland the the same view was taken by in Rex v 'J'…and it has never been in any way dissented from there.
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In conclusion, Hudson upheld the existence of the common law offence of cheating the public revenue.
Turner (1964), Kenny (1966)
The last edition of Russell, On Crime, edited by Turner in 1964, considered, in a chapter, the law on cheats, frauds, false tokens and false pretences. 313 As to cheats, it noted:
At common law many cheats and frauds affecting the public welfare and causing an actual prejudice are indictable.
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Turner then discussed: (a) cheats levelled against public justice; (b) frauds which affected the Crown and the public at large, although they might arise in the course of some particular transaction or contract with private individuals; 315 and (c) the selling of unwholesome provisions. Finally, he stated:
In some cases the rendering of false accounts and other frauds practised by persons in official situations have been deemed offences so affecting the public as to be indictable. Thus, where two persons were indicted for enabling persons to pass their accounts with the pay office in such a way as to enable them to defraud the government, and it was objected that it was only a private matter of account and not indictable, the court held otherwise, as it related to the public revenue. 316 [ie. Bembridge] There are precedents of indictments against overseers of the poor for refusing to account, 317 [ie Commings] and for rendering false accounts and of an indictment against a surveyor of highways for converting to his own use gravel dug at the expense of the parish, and for employing for his own private gain and emolument the labourers and teams of the parishioners which he ought to have employed in repairing the highways. 318 Where, however, the dishonest activity was of a sort which aimed at defrauding such members of the public as a whole who might come within its reach, then because of its generally injurious character it was treated by the common law as a crime (although only in the degree of a misdemeanour), in any instance in which any particular member of the public suffered by it. False statements without more were held not to be enough, and some misleading device in a permanent form was needed, such as false weights, measures, trade-marks, loaded dice, marked playing cards or even unwholesome food. Thus in the case mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the court stated that it was 'not indictable unless he came with false tokens; playing with false dice is, for that is such a cheat as a person of ordinary capacity cannot discover'.
In R v Hudson [see 19] the Court of Criminal Appeal upheld the conviction of the appellant on a charge of making false statements to the prejudice of the Crown and the public revenue with intent to defraud by causing to be submitted to an inspector of income tax with intent to defraud a false certificate of disclosure: the court held that a fraud on the sovereign or the public (which were synonymous terms) was 312 At p 261. 313 Turner, n 17, ch 70. 314 Ibid, at p 1155. 315 Turner discussed Brailsford, see n 292. 316 Turner cited Bembridge, see 13. Also. East, see 14. 317 Turner cited Commings, see n 270. 318 At pp 1158-9. As to the case in 1799, see n 271. 319 an indictable misdemeanour at common law.
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Turner also noted that:
Numerous cases which were formerly treated as common law cheats are now more conveniently dealt with under more specific heads owing to developments in the law by statute or by an increased particularity in the common law itself, for example by the development of the law of forgery.
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In conclusion, Turner considered the offence of cheating the public revenue, mainly with reference to Bembridge and Hudson.
Mavji (1987)
In this case, 322 the appellant conducted a large scale traffic in gold by three different types of transaction and at prices which would have inevitably produced a loss but for the fact that he had charged VAT but had not accounted for it to the Customs & Excise. He was convicted of the offence of cheating the public revenue.
 An appeal was made on the basis that deception was a necessary ingredient of the offence. It was held the common law offence did not necessarily require a false representation -either by words or conduct.
Cheating could include any form of fraudulent conduct which resulted in diverting money from the public revenue and depriving it of money to which it was entitled;  The appellant, in the circumstances, had a statutory duty to make VAT returns and to pay over to the Crown the VAT due. He had done neither. Therefore, he was guilty of cheating the Crown and the public revenue. No further act, or omission, was required to be alleged or proved.
Two principal submissions were made. One was that the Finance Act 1972, s 38(1) 323 also covered the situation. A submission was made that it would be anomalous if the common law and statutory offences stood side by side, with no more having to be proved to establish the former than the latter and, in the former case, without limit of penalty. Michael Davies J stated:
We see no anomaly. In our judgment section 38(1) of the Finance Act 1972 was a 'catch-all' provision directed specifically to punish evasion of VAT when that tax was newly introduced and has no bearing on the general principles of cheating in relation to the Public Revenue, particularly as there is no counterpart to section 38(1) in the statutory provisions relating to other taxes. 324 It was also submitted that deception was an ingredient of the common law offence. After being referred to various authorities, 325 Michael Davies J stated:
in none of the cases or authorities such as Hawkins is the distinction between 'deceit' involving a general act and 'non-deceit' involving no more than an omission canvassed or regarded as vital or indeed relevant. The distinction has always been and in our view remains between 'frauds affecting the Crown and public at large'…and those which affect only individuals.
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In conclusion, Mavji held that deception was not a pre-requisite for the offence of cheating the public revenue. Also, the fact that a statutory offence also existed did not preclude the common law offence. The first proposition was unsurprising since cheating the public revenue is a misprision.
Redford (1988) 327
This case was very similar to Mavji (1987). The appellant was the proprietor of a motor trade business dealing with the buying, repairing and re-selling of motor vehicles. He admitted he had failed to register for VAT or to pay any.  He was charged with contravening the Finance Act 1972, s 38(3) and the VAT Act 1983, s 39(1). It was sought to amend the indictment in order to charge the appellant with the common law offence of cheating the public revenue (this was granted);  On appeal, the appellant argued that: (a) the common law offence was not available when the facts showed that a statutory offence had been committed; and (b) the common law offence required some positive act of deception directed at the public revenue. Mere omission, or failure to act, was not enough.
The court held that the Theft Act 1968, s 32(1) should be given its plain meaning. Thus, the common law offence still existed and was indictable whatever statutory offences might be available on the facts. Further that the common law offence was satisfied by a matter of omission in the present case.  The court followed Mavji, holding that the point there was 'almost precisely on all fours.' 328 It also cited Bembridge (1783) which it described as the 'locus classicus of the offence of cheating the Public Revenue'; 329  The court held that the failure of the appellant to register for VAT and to make the requisite returns and payments to the Commissioners of Customs and Excise was sufficient to constitute the offence.
In conclusion, Redford held that the common law offence existed. Further, omission, as well as commission, was sufficient to comprise the offence. The first proposition was unsurprising since cheating the public revenue is a misprision.
Mulligan (1990), Less (1993), Hunt (1994) (a) Mulligan (1990)
In this case 330 from company premises, there was stolen: (a) a certificate of exemption from income tax used by sub-contractors in the construction industry (form 714); and (b) a book of vouchers acknowledging gross money received by an exempted sub-contractor (form 715).
 The stolen form 714 was found concealed in M's clothing (he said that he had received it from another person, W). M also acknowledged he had acquired the book of form 715 vouchers and left it at the house of a third party while looking for buyers of the vouchers;  M was charged with conspiring (with W) to cheat Her Majesty the Queen and the public revenue, going equipped to cheat, handling and theft.
A submission was made that the common law offence was not known to the law. It was rejected on the basis, in particular, of Hudson (see 19) and Redford (see 22).
(b) Less (1993)
This unreported case 331 concerned the dishonest withholding of PAYE and National Insurance payments. The trial judge stated:
The common law offence of cheating the public revenue does not necessarily require a false representation either by words or conduct. Cheating can include any form of fraudulent conduct which results in diverting money from the revenue and in depriving the revenue of the money to which it is entitled. 332 It has, of course, to be fraudulent conduct. That is to say, deliberate conduct by the defendant to prejudice, or to take the risk of prejudicing, the Revenue's right to the tax in question, knowing that he has no right to do so.
One would agree with the first sentence since the offence of defrauding the revenue is a misprision and, thus, can occur by way of omission or commission. Therefore, deception, or any other active form of misrepresentation, is 328 At p 7. 329 Ibid, p 8. 330 [1990] Crim LR 427. 331 The Times, 30 th March 1993. See also Ormerod, n 28, p 629. 332 Cf. Ormerod, n 28, p 629, fn 17 'The reference to money being diverted from the Revenue is, it is submitted, unnecessary, since it is clear that no loss need actually arise.' One would agree.
www.ccsenet.org/jpl Journal of Politics and Law Vol. 8, No. 1; 2015 not required. 333 One would disagree with the second sentence. Being a misprision, loss is not a pre-requisite. It is the conduct (the 'contempt') which is punished, not the consequence. One would agree with the third sentence. To 'cheat' is the same as to defraud, just as the earlier Anglo-Norman word 'deceite' is the same as fraud.
(c) Hunt (1994)
In this case, 334 the appellant appealed against his conviction of conspiring to cheat the Inland (Public) Revenue on the basis that loss had to be proved. This was dismissed, on the basis that there was ample authority to showfrom the cases 335 -that cheating the public revenue was a conduct offence and that no loss had to be proved. One would agree, the offence being a misprision.
(d) Ryan (1994)
The appellant were tried for cheating the public revenue for dishonestly failing to pay VAT on the takings of gaming machines. The defence sought to quash the indictment on the basis that the VATA 1983, sch 6, group 4, note 1(d) (a proviso excluding gaming machines from exemption) was incompatible with the Sixth Council Directive (771/388/EC). This was rejected.
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In conclusion, in Mulligan, the existence of the common law offence was upheld. In Hunt, it was established that proof of loss was not a pre-requisite for the offence. The latter proposition was unsurprising since cheating the public revenue is a misprision.
Summary of the Law
From a review of the law from the earliest times, the following would seem clear:
Defrauding the Public Revenue. From, at least, the Laws of Henry I (c.1113) it was an offence not to pay tax (Danegeld) when duly levied. The punishment was a fine payable to the Crown (wite). Also, unlawful appropriation of the sovereign's money was reserved to the Crown and was punishable as theft. Matters to be inquired at by justices at Eyre cited by Bracton (c. 1240) and Britton (c. 1290) included various revenue offences. The punishment was usually a fine -as well as loss of land, loss of office and imprisonment in some cases; Public Revenue. In early times, the reference would have been to the Crown and, more particularly, that part of the Crown which comprised the Exchequer (today, called the 'Treasury ') 337 to which all sums had to be paid in person, on oath. Thus, 'Public Revenue', today, means only sums paid in to the Treasury and not to a wider concept of 'public' revenue; an offence to sell rotten (noisome) food. In 1803, the legal writer East, in the only edition of his textwhen writing on cheat -adopted many examples provided by Hawkins as well as cited the case of Treeve (1796). This case, however, is not one of cheating the public revenue. Rather, it is one of selling rotten food to the public (and would have been committed whether or not Treeve was a government contractor). Most of the cases cited by Hawkins and East were not relevant to cheating the public revenue (that is, the Crown). Rather, they related to cheating the general public which was quite different.
Cheating the Public Revenue. The locus classicus of this offence is Bembridge (1783). However, it was preceded by cases from much earlier times. Thus, the offence is long established. Cases which exemplify this offence are contained in Appendix A.
Unnecessary Cases
One of the problems of a large number of common law offences is that they are so old and so obscure, that, often, unnecessary cases are brought in respect of them, the original nature and scope of the offence being mis-understood. 339 In the case of this offence the following may be noted:
 Existence of the Common Law Offence. The common law offence of cheating the revenue would seem to have existed at least, c 1113, long pre-dating modern income tax law (dating from 1798). The fact that tax legislation might stipulate similar penalties does not, per se, abolish any common law offence or penalty -the long established principle of interpretation being that the latter can only be abolished by express legislation, and not by implication. 340 The assertion there was no offence at common law arose in Bradbury v Edlin (1920) where it was expressly rejected. However, the issue re-arose in Rex v J (1931), Hudson (1956) , Mavji (1987) , Redford (1988) and Mulligan (1990);  Omission. The common law offence was a misprision -which can occur by omission as well as commission. However, this issue was raised in Mavji (1987);  Deception. The common law offence is one of fraud, which includes deception. However, deception is not a pre-requisite, since fraud is wider than deception. The words 'deceite' and 'cheat' referred to fraud, not just to deception. Whether deception was a pre-requisite was raised in Mavji (1987) and in Redford (1988) . Further, deception is not required since the offence is a misprision and, thus, can occur by omission as well as commission;  Loss. The common law offence is a misprision. Thus, there is no requirement that it be a pre-requisite that loss be proved. Further, common sense suggests various difficulties if it were. However, this issue was raised in Hunt (1994).
The Law Commission was founded in 1965. One criticism of it is that it has left to 'linger' many common law offences with the result that much unnecessary litigation has arisen, at great cost to the taxpayer. None of the above cases, post-Hudson (1965), should have occurred since the common law position was clear.
A Statutory Offence
The need for a statutory formulation of this offence would seem unarguable. However, the statutory offence can be, legitimately, wider than the modern caselaw suggests.  Fraud on the Exchequer. In early times, it was, clearly, a fraud on the Exchequer to fail to pay -or use fraud to avoid paying -when owed, inter alia: (a) any tax (danegeld) and successor taxes; (b) any customs and excise (viz. prisage on wine and other prises); (c) any fines and amercements levied by the royal courts (see 4(a)). Thus, this situation should prevail today;  Deception & Proof of Loss. The statutory offence should not require as pre-requisites: (a) deception; (b) proof of loss. These never were pre-requisites of the offence in early times;  Dishonesty. A pre-requisite of the offence has always been dishonesty. None of the caselaw indicates that oversight, unintentional error etc, was criminally culpable;
 Fraud. A pre-requisite of the offence should also be fraud, which contains, implicit within it, both 'knowing' and 'dishonesty'. 342 The word 'false' is not an appropriate word instead of fraud; with intent to defraud the Crown of any duty payable thereon or to evade any such prohibition or restriction with respect to the same.'
If it was also provided that these offences did not require; (a) deception; (b) proof of loss and (c) could be by way of omission as well as commission, then the common law and statutory offences could be combined. Indeed, the basic provision should be that a 'person with intent to defraud' since this is common to all the offences and would cover 'knowingly'. 353 Thus, it may be time for the common law offence to become a generic offence. This could then apply to all stipulated tax and customs and excise acts as well as to other frauds against the public revenue. This, obviously, would reduce uncertainty and litigation. It would also avoid alternative, or cummulative, offences.
In conclusion, consideration should be given to there being 
Misconduct in a Public or Judicial Office
A previous article has considered the offence of misconduct in a public or judicial office. It is important that this offence (which, it is asserted, should also, now, be statutory) be dovetailed with the offence of defrauding the public revenue.
 In the case of the former it has been asserted it should not cover financial offences since, otherwise, there is a real danger it will be used as a 'catch all' to cover offences that are caught anyway within the terms of the Theft Acts 1968-78 and other related legislation;  Further, there is no need for this either. If one considers the caselaw, the cases cited as examples of the former only comprise: (a) Bembridge (1783); (b) Buck & Hale (1703) 355 and (c) Llewellyn v Jones (1967) . 356 The first two are now covered by the Theft Act, 1968, s 17. In (c), a county court registrar was charged with (i) 6 counts of misconduct in a public office; (ii) 5 counts of fraudulent conversion; (iii) one count of fraudulent disposal of property; (iv) one count of obtaining credit under false pretences. The offence committed was that he dishonestly appropriate court funds held on trust for two disabled persons (he used the money to pay off a mortgage). Today, one is sceptical whether any charge in (i) should have been brought since the matter should have been left to the general law, to prevent the offence of misconduct in a public office being used as a catch-all (or to enhance the penalty). However, in any case, since the funds in question comprised Crown money (albeit on trust), one would assert that defrauding the public revenue should also include where a person intends to defraud the same of money paid into court (see 27, point 3);  If this is not done there is a risk that a person could be alternatively prosecuted for fraud offences under (a) tax or customs and excise laws; (b) misconduct in a public or judicial office; (c) defrauding (cheating) the public revenue; (d) fraud and theft offences under the general law. This is conducive to confusion and litigation. Thus, it is asserted that (b) should not apply when (a), (c) or (d) apply and that (c) should not apply where (a) otherwise expressly covers the matter. Further, (b) and (c) should be statutory.
In 
Conclusion
It is important our criminal law be modern and up-to-date as well as intelligible. Unfortunately, much of our criminal law is still very dated and, often, it is virtually intelligible.  Given this -and to prevent unnecessary confusion and cases -, it would seem imperative that common law offences are now either abolished (where obsolete) or placed in a modern statutory context;  In the case of the offence of 'Cheating the Public Revenue' this would not seem difficult (or time consuming) once the original nature of the offence is understood. Thus, there should be a statutory offence of 'Defrauding the Public Revenue' based on an 'intent to defraud'. The latter word implicitly contains the concept of 'knowingly' and 'dishonestly' and not just error, oversight etc;  In time, this offence should be 'merged' with the statutory offences relating to tax and customs and excise evasion. In so doing, this would return to the basic offence as it was at the time of Bracton (c 1240) and before that. That is, it was 'theft' where a person appropriated revenue otherwise due to the Exchequer.
357 357 In the time of Bracton (c 1240), a person (the accountant, the one required to pay the Crown) had to appear in person at the Exchequer and to give an oath. Thus, to deliberately fail to provide his the tax position to the Exchequer was also perjury (see also Reeves, n 65, vol 2, pp 350, 353) . One wonders whether this should not be brought back. That is, that all persons should be required to swear on oath that, 'to the best of their knowledge, the tax return (statement) which they provide contains a just and accurate position as to their tax affairs, such that the Revenue will be able to accurately determine the due amount of tax owed.' If a person breached this, they would be liable for perjury, regardless of any other offence. This would also likely close down many a dubious tax avoidance scheme which operates on the basis of the Revenue not fully understanding (or it being too complex for them to understand) the true tax position.
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